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Academic and Policy Positions

University of Arizona, Eller College of Business, McGuire Center for Entrepreneurship Interim Executive Director, 2023-2024; Adviser & Associate Mentor, 2022-2023

University of Arizona, Center for the Philosophy of Freedom  Adviser and Research Professor, 2021-2022

Harvard University, Law School Lecturer, 1994-1997 

Harvard University, Kennedy School of Government Associate Professor of Public Policy, 1990-1994

Harvard University, Kennedy School of Government Assistant Professor of Public Policy, 1987-1990 

U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Senior Economist, 1985-1986 

Yale University  Teaching Fellow, Research Associate, 1982-1984, 1986-1987

Research Areas

Corporate governance:  board behavior and effectiveness, active investing strategies, law and regulation

The market for corporate control: history, efficiency and effects, regulation

Federal securities regulations: effects and efficiency


Yale University M.A. (1982), M.Phil (1983), Ph.D. (1988), Economics 

Harvard University  A.B. (1981), Political Economy

​Policy contributions

Deregulation of Shareholder Communications  Research catalyzed a rollback of SEC regulations that had restricted communications among stockholders, making possible unrestricted shareholder discussions about strategy and performance at public companies

Reform of Director Elections  Research catalyzed a change in the SEC's rules to facilitate the election of non-controlling slates of shareholder-nominated director candidates at public companies

New Foundations  Founded Harvard-based multidisciplinary research group that included academics, policy-makers, institutional investors, corporate founders, CEOs, and counsels to develop new practices to foster more substantive relationships between major corporations and their large investors

Institutional Policy Activism on Governance  Helped lead the movement, working with CalPERS, CalSTRS, The Council of Institutional Investors, and others, to advocate for governance policy reform at the federal and state levels

Proxy Rule Reform  Proposed remedies for inefficiencies caused by regulation of public company shareholder voting, e.g., detachment of voting rights from economic outcomes due to record date regulation

Insider Trading  Served as an expert witness for the SEC in its prosecution of several important insider trading and market fraud cases including the landmark Crazy Eddie case

Areas of Teaching Experience

Corporate & entrepreneurial finance

Corporate governance and control

Financial regulation: intermediaries & markets

Analytic methods & case studies in public policy

Macro & micro economics

Organizational structure, culture, and performance

Funded Research Programs

Chair, Corporate Voting Research Project, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 1989-1993   

Chair, New Foundations Working Group, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 1991-1993 


Secondary & Higher Education

Adviser to multiple universities on strategy, competitive positioning, and program development.  Oversight, brand and program development, and strategic and financial planning at independent primary and secondary schools, including The Berkeley School and Maybeck High School, both in Berkeley, CA, and The Gregory School in Tucson, AZ. 

Selected Publications 


Below are examples from over 50 articles and book contributions in venues including The Journal of Finance, The Journal of Law & Economics, The Journal of Financial Economics, The Harvard Business Review, The New York Times, and The Wall Street Journal.  First 9 articles can be accessed directly by clicking on on underlined titles.

The Rise of the Political Model of Corporate Governance and Corporate Control, New York University Law Review, November 1993, vol. 68, no. 5, pages 1003-1071 

The Promise of the Governed Corporation, Harvard Business Review, March-April 1995, vol. 73, no.2, pages 89-98  

Beyond Takeovers: Politics Comes to Corporate Control, Harvard Business Review, March-April 1992, vol. 70, no.2, pages 83-93


Proxy voting and the SEC: Investor Protection Versus Market Efficiency, Journal of Financial Economics, 1991, vol. 29, issue 2, pages 241-28

Raiders, Targets, and Politics: The History and Future of American Corporate Control, Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 1992, vol. 5, no. 3, pages 6-18

The Effects of Antitakeover Amendments on Takeover Activity: Some Direct Evidence, Journal of Law and Economics, 1987, vol.30, issue 2, pages 353-67

Shareholder Activism and Share Values: The Causes and Consequences of Counter-solicitations against Management Antitakeover Proposals, Journal of Law and Economics, 1989, vol.32, issue 2, pages 357-79

On the Motives for Choosing a Corporate Governance Structure: A Study of Corporate Reaction to the Pennsylvania Takeover Law, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 1992, vol.8, issue 3, pages 656-72

How the Proxy Rules Discourage Constructive Engagement:  Regulatory Barriers to Electing a Minority of Directors, with L. Gordon and R. Gilson, Journal of Corporation Law, vol. 17, issue.1, Fall 1991, pages 29-48


Proxy Contests and the Efficiency of Shareholder Oversight, Journal of Financial Economics, 1988, vol.20, issues 1-1, pages 237-265


The Information Effects of Takeover Bids and Resistance, Journal of Financial Economics, 1988, vol.22, issue 2, pages 207-227

Creating Relationships Between Corporations and Institutional Investors: An Introduction, Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 1992, vol. 6, issue 2, pages 32-34


Are Large Shareholders Effective Monitors?  An Investigation of Share Ownership and Corporate Performance, with R. Zeckhauser, in R. G. Hubbard, ed., Asymmetric Information, Corporate Finance, and Investment, University of Chicago Press

Information, Ownership Structure, and Shareholder Voting: Evidence From Shareholder-Sponsored Corporate Governance Proposals, with L. Gordon, The Journal of Finance, 1993, vol.48, issue 2, pages 697-718

Clearly Heard on the Street:  The Effects of Takeover Rumors on Stock Prices, with R. Zeckhauser, The Journal of Business, vo.63, issue 3, pages 291-308

Are Institutional Investors Speculators?, with R. Shiller, Journal of Portfolio Management, vol.13, issue 1, pages 46-52

Survey Evidence on the Diffusion of Interest Among Institutional Investors, with R. Shiller, Cowles Foundation, Yale University, and National Bureau of Economic Research, 1986

ESOPS and Corporate Control, with L. Gordon, Journal of Financial Economics, vol.27, no.3, pages 525-555

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